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The rhetoric of the virtual stubbornly clings to digital culture, even though our 
experience of working within it is of a resisting medium that only behaves in certain 
ways. The persistence of the virtual demands attention: why do we cling to such a 
description even while we quite willingly recognise the interpenetration of the world 
beyond the monitor and that represented on it? In education we’re encouraged to use 
Virtual Learning Environments, as if somehow these spaces are not as real as 
classrooms; we participate (or read about others participating) in virtual worlds such 
as Second Life or World of Warcraft, places that imitate the real world, providing 
access to fantasies that are underpinned by very real economics; and we exploit the 
World Wide Web, believing in its textual metaphors (pages, hypertext) while 
ignoring its presence as a medium. In my contribution to this forum I want to 
suggest that our insistence on the immateriality of digital culture enforces an 
ontological distinction that overdetermines the materiality of the world beyond the 
monitor while misrecognizing the new things that are displayed upon it. Rather than 
continue to use the virtual as a category, I would like to argue using an alternative 
term, the apparition.1 Unlike the virtual, which foregrounds its effect of the real with 
reality itself present only as absence, apparition has two meanings: the first is an 
immaterial appearance, a ghostly presence that, like the virtual, can signal an absent 
materiality; the second is simply the appearance of something, specifically the 
emergence of something into history. It is this latter meaning, I suggest, that permits 
materiality to re-enter digital discourse.  
 The emergence of the virtual as a category has been linked to the 
development of the information economy and, in particular, the electronic 
communication networks that sustain it today.2 However, concerns over the 
virtuality of information are not uniquely postmodern. In 1890, in one of his regular 
surveys of science education published in Chemical News, William Crookes 
bemoaned the lack of practical scientific training provided in schools. Without 
science, he argued, ‘in a word the study of things in contradistinction to words and 
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abstractions’, it is impossible to acquire the ‘art of observation’.3 For Crookes, this 
faculty was vital as it taught students to appreciate the materiality of things: 
The question how we are to learn is not less important than its 
companion what we are to learn. The youth who studies chemistry from 
books, however closely and laboriously, will reap little or no advantage 
from his labours. If he has done nothing further than read he will still be 
in the bonds of verbalism, unable to learn from and to interpret 
phenomena.4 
Although Crookes was participating in wider debates over the status of science as an 
intellectual attainment and the relationship between scientific education and the state 
of the nation’s industries, his comments also suggest a certain unease with the 
privileging of knowledge generated from representations rather than phenomena. As 
a chemist, Crookes’s work constantly confronted him with objects of an uncertain or 
liminal materiality. At the time of this article, for instance, his spectroscopic 
research into the rare earths involved breaking down supposed elements into yet 
more subtle constituents, and his work on radiant matter — made possible by his 
innovations in the production of spaces devoid of things, vacuums — established the 
cathode ray as a potential fourth state of matter.5 Crookes, of course, was also a 
spiritualist but even his encounters with spirits were predicated on materiality. 
Ghosts were not just virtual beings, signifying an absent body, but rapped tables, 
materialized in cabinets and, in the case of Katie King, had pulses one could 
measure.6 In all these aspects of his life, Crookes was working on phenomena that 
were either difficult to see (spirits in darkened rooms, products of chemical 
experiments) or subvisible (cathode rays, chemical elements). At stake was not just 
making them visible, but recording their traces so that others could see them too. 
Crookes, therefore, grappled with apparitions in all senses of the word. For 
him, materiality was not a given but something that must be worked upon to be 
made substantial. Yet it is precisely such an awareness that is lost in accounts that 
gloss over the specificities of the nineteenth century in order to posit it as an 
industrial period that has been surpassed in the creation of the post-industrial 
present. This teleological narrative, closely intertwined with the workings of global 
capitalism, posits an information age as a way to displace while exerting mastery 
over a simpler, less sophisticated past that is simultaneously realized in the present 
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as the ‘developing world’. Yet the history that sustains this narrative is suspect: 
when we view the industrial age through posthuman eyes we do not see a period 
structured by economies based upon the ownership and transfer of things; rather, we 
see a world that contained things, was haunted by absent things, and struggled to 
establish what are things and what are not. Nineteenth-century studies offers a great 
deal to histories of materiality, and a more nuanced understanding of materiality will 
allow us to better understand not only nineteenth-century attitudes to the things in its 
world, but also the cultural work required to bring them into being. 
It is vital that we recognise both the different material forms that things can 
take and the role that people, texts and artefacts play in cohering them. 
Unfortunately, this rich material history is also often lost in nineteenth-century 
studies today. Our preference for reading about things rather than thinking about the 
things themselves ensures that we encounter the period’s objects largely as 
representations. Equally, our methodologies reveal a textual bias that prevents us 
thinking about materiality seriously. Although psychoanalysis, poststructuralism and 
postmodernism have all demonstrated that materiality does not necessarily structure 
the real, they do so by recourse to the sign. As signification is predicated on a double 
negation — signifiers refer only to other signifiers, and there is no essential link 
between signifier and signified — it prevents the easy reduction of the real to an 
objective, observable, material realm; however, in opening space for culture, 
signification simultaneously reduces things to surfaces upon which signs can play. 
For instance, to celebrate the jouissance of textuality, Barthes must suppress the 
material, enforcing a demarcation between work and text that he recognises is 
untenable.7 Such approaches betray the linguistic bias that underpins them and so, 
even when applied to material culture, cannot account for the material properties of 
things. 
 Yet the nineteenth century is a crucial period in both the history of things, 
and the history of how those things entered the world. It was the century that saw the 
institutionalization of scientific disciplines, sites in which new things were 
discovered and then allocated a place in nature. It saw the proliferation of museums 
and collections that brought things together, often drawing upon new spaces of 
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imperial expansion. It was the century that developed various strands of intellectual 
property law that could establish not only the ownership of things, but also their 
identity over different forms. We, like Crookes’s schoolboys, risk developing the 
‘vice of inobservance’ as a result of ‘the exclusively literary character of our present 
system of education’.8 If we apply theories and gather information exclusively from 
textual sources we develop knowledges that hamper our capacity to understand not 
just the materiality of the nineteenth century, but also those new objects that are 
emerging in digital culture. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that a dematerialized critical theory lends itself so 
well to studies of digital culture.9 Just as the web seems to liberate information (the 
hackers’ slogan: ‘information wants to be free’) from its material carriers, so critical 
theory insists that meaning is produced by signs that are more or less independent of 
the things that carry them. A similar discourse operates within information theory. In 
How We Became Posthuman (1999), N. Katherine Hayles traces the origin of the 
virtual to the emergence of cybernetics in the aftermath of the Second World War.10 
She identifies the Macy Conferences (1943-1954) as a formative moment through 
which a concept of information emerged that was independent of materiality. 
Information theorists conceptualized information as probability logarithms, sets of 
mathematical principles that could be used to model informational flow regardless 
of specific material context. Claude Shannon’s description of information as a 
message, encoded in a signal and then decoded at its destination, posits 
communication as a closed system based upon stasis.11 A successful message in this 
system is one that is not altered by noise from the systems through which it moves. 
Although such models are conceptually distinct from poststructuralist notions of 
communication, which locate meaning not in the origin of a message but in the 
destination, Hayles suggests that poststructuralism began to re-examine the 
relationship between presence and absence in signifying systems at the moment 
when it was being displaced by one predicated upon pattern and randomness.12 
‘Presence and absence’, she writes, ‘were forced into visibility, so to speak, because 
they were already losing their constitutive power to form the ground for 
discourse’.13 For Hayles, Lacan’s floating signifier, which posits an absent 
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materiality, is displaced by the flickering signifier that, with its roots in information 
theory, attempts to displace the material altogether. 
Hayles’s argument is that we must recognise the constitutive role that 
materiality (even experienced as noise) plays in information systems in order to 
reconceptualize the posthuman so that it is not reducible to cybernetics.14 While I am 
sympathetic to her arguments, I think that there is a different way in which 
materiality seems to haunt information. When Hayles describes flickering signifiers, 
she does so as a chain of codes, in which signifiers on one level operate as signifieds 
on another. The relations between levels remain arbitrary, but can be stipulated by 
altering higher-level codes. Bruno Latour, in considering the way in which scientists 
inscribe laboratory events (and so the unknown things that produce them) into 
persuasive documents, suggests something similar.15 For Latour, science studies ‘has 
always been an analysis of how language slowly becomes capable of transporting 
things themselves without deformation through transformation’.16 Rather than 
understand science as an attempt to isolate and define the material world, and 
scientific writing as a means of representing it textually, Latour sees scientific 
practice — whether this is doing experiments, analyzing results, or writing papers — 
as a process that deliberately confuses epistemological and ontological questions, 
blurring the boundaries between things and the words that describe them.17 If, in 
scientific debate, the side that triumphs is ‘the one who can muster the most well-
aligned and faithful allies’, then this privileges a certain type of writing and imaging 
which makes ‘this agnostic situation more favourable’.18 This evidence consists of 
‘objects which have the properties of being mobile but also immutable, presentable, 
readable and combinable with one another’.19 These objects, which Latour calls 
inscriptions, are the final stage in a process which refers back to the phenomena that 
they describe. However, inscriptions do not refer to things in an exterior world 
beyond them, but instead present them within themselves: by recording the material 
traces of phenomena under carefully delineated conditions, it is possible to gesture 
to its presence as inscription rather than maintain it in a distinct external ontological 
realm. Scientists, Latour claims, ‘start seeing something once they stop looking at 
nature and look exclusively and obsessively at prints and flat inscriptions’.20 If 
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scientists — or readers, viewers, users, or members of an audience — accept the 
stability of the links of the chain, then they also accept the presence of the 
phenomena, despite the evident transformations and translations it has undergone to 
reach them. 
Latour describes reference in semiotic terms, in which each link in a chain 
operates as sign for the one that precedes it and a thing for the one that follows.21 
Hayles’s flickering signifiers similarly consist of chains of signification, in which 
some layers operate as discrete processes that can be manipulated by other codes in 
the system. Although it seems that computer programs lack the presence of a 
phenomena, this is only problematic if we conceive the origins of materiality in a 
discrete natural realm that is manipulated by humans and then has signification 
imposed upon it. As Hayles argues, the metaphysics of presence that underpins both 
liberal humanist ideology and its poststructural critique requires materiality to act as 
the placeholder of the real: in liberal humanist terms, the self is articulated against 
an external, knowable world; in poststructural terms, this external world is lost in 
chains of signification. A system predicated on pattern and randomness, however, 
has no need of origins and has no definite ends. Meanings are not pre-supposed as 
being in the world; rather the world, as environment, establishes the patterns through 
which we make sense of it. Once the boundaries between the natural world as the 
source of materiality and the human culture that manipulate it are troubled, we can 
begin to recognise the many ways in which things can be material. After all, given 
the correct resources a computer program is as repeatable as a scientific experiment; 
we simply deny its material existence by considering it wholly the result of human 
ingenuity and so independent of natural, material resources. As Latour argues, our 
tendency to ‘black-box’ science and technology and render them unobtrusive aspects 
of our social lives masks the complex systems that constitute them.22 In a way, 
malfunctions — whether of bodies or machines — always remind us of the 
contingency of materiality: what we think of as well-bounded objects are revealed to 
consist of a host of components, all interacting differently with the world around 
them.23   
James Mussell, Digital Culture, Materiality and Nineteenth-Century Studies, 
Materiality and Digitisation Forum 
19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century, 6 (2008) www.19.bbk.ac.uk 
 
 7
Just as Crookes insists that the abstractions of verbalism must be tempered 
with studies of the things themselves so, I suggest, must the rhetoric of the virtual be 
tempered by practical experience of designing and building digital resources.24 The 
nineteenth century is also important here, as (at least in the UK) its printed material 
remains are largely out of copyright. It is very difficult, in producing a digital 
edition, not to be aware of the materiality of both source materials and final 
resource. The stages that are involved — scanning, analysis, encoding, markup, 
storage, processing — do not efface the materiality of the source object, but instead 
reproduce aspects of it in the resource that results. For instance, in producing the 
Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (Hhttp://www.ncse.kcl.ac.uk/) we had to 
establish not only what were the source objects (bound volumes or single issues? 
Supplements? Editions? Sections? Articles? Headlines? Sentences? Words? 
Images?) and work out their relationships with one another, but also to address the 
changes in form introduced when transforming disparate runs of hard copy into reels 
of microfilm and then into digital images and transcripts. This is a type of editing 
that consistently reminds the editor of the materiality of the objects being 
manipulated: digital images have properties just like images printed on paper; 
periodicals in digital form have to be stored (just not on shelves) and XML has 
structures just like other publications. A good resource will function within Latour’s 
model of reference: not so much as a digital surrogate for an absent object, but 
instead as a new object that reproduces the things to which it refers. 
The term apparition avoids the discourse of the virtual outlined by Hayles in 
How We Became Posthuman. Although in its more common sense, apparition 
simply means becoming visible, it does not signify lack in the same way as the 
virtual. The word apparition also describes the coming into being of things, the 
emergence of new entities into history. It is this latter aspect that is important as it 
ensures that we can recognise the ways in which digital culture is changing our 
world. With the proliferation of web 2.0 applications, digital objects are increasingly 
liberated from the resources in which they were created.25 Although their properties 
are defined by code in advance, the potential for them to exist in new contexts 
makes them unpredictable, providing them stages upon which they can perform. 
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Like scientific phenomena in the laboratory, such conditions grant digital objects the 
autonomy to demonstrate unexpected properties. As studies of nineteenth-century 
objects and of the nineteenth-century people who worked with them remind us, we 
have always experienced a world in which materiality has to be established. It would 
be naïve to use the apparitions within digital culture to enforce an ontological divide 
between the digital and the world beyond it that misrecognises both the materiality 
of the objects each contains and the work that must be performed to create them. 
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